![]() The modern problem of knowledge, namely, “how is knowledge as a relation between an inner domain (the subject) and an outer domain (the object) possible?” (95), presupposes a modern conception of the mind according to which knowledge is the achievement of an individual and inner mind, facing nature and society (67, 119), and operating in virtue of representational powers radically different from natural forces (205). The Invention of the Modern Mind and Contemporary Cartesian MaterialismĤ As Dewey already pointed out in The Quest for Certainty, overcoming the Spectator Theory of Knowledge requires a criticism of the conception of mind that it presupposes (LW4: 18-19). This is why the reading of the book definitely suggests – in my view – how much Dewey’s philosophy of mind is different from today’s orthodoxy not only in virtue of its contents (Steiner 2008), but also and especially because of its inclusion and relations with Dewey’s broader concerns with historical, epistemological, pedagogical and social questions. But – and this is crucial – they will find a remarkable continuity between Dewey’s remarks on mental phenomena (and the sciences pertaining to them), and historical considerations on the problem of knowledge, on the birth of philosophy, on the emergence of modern science, or on the technological dimensions of intelligence. I will present some specific topics: the invention of the modern mind and contemporary Cartesian materialism (section I) Dewey’s adverbial conception of mental phenomena (section II) the new status of the brain (and of brain sciences) in that view (section III) the importance of temporal continuity and transactions (section IV).ģ From the point of view of content, readers of Dewey’s papers such as What are states of mind? (1912), Body and mind (1928), How is mind to be known? (1945), and of various chapters of Experience and Nature and Art as Experience will not find, in this book, totally new elements concerning the status of mental phenomena in Dewey’s philosophy. It is of course hopeless to give a substantial account of the richness of these sections. This is the reason why the present paper will be about Dewey’s philosophy of mind (a potentially misleading expression, as we will see) as it is developed throughout the book, although with a special focus on the first section of chapter X. But the historical project of the previous parts of the books makes clear that “Mind and Body” denotes the problem that we have inherited from modern philosophy, and that Dewey wants to dissolve.Ģ Not all the chapter deals with issues pertaining to mental phenomena, and we can find in other places of the book very interesting sections dealing with mindedness and its study. ![]() 1 “Mind and Body” seems like a step back, presupposing a dualism between a mind and a body that should be reunified or put into relation. The title of the chapter – Dewey’s own title – might sound surprising to the readers of chapter VII of Experience and Nature, where Dewey explicitly coined the term ‘body-mind’ for insisting on the continuity between mental qualities and non-mental qualities in experience. Its three sections correspond to three different folders, yet all written in 1942. ![]() ![]() 1 “Body-mind simply designates what actually takes place when a living body is implicated in situatio (.)ġ In Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy (UPMP hereafter), Dewey develops a comprehensive account of mindedness and a genealogical picture of the modern concept of ‘mind.’ Chapter X, “Mind and Body”, is the longest chapter of the book.
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